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Book Review
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY. NEIL MACCORMICK. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978. Pp. xi, 298.
There sometimes emerges a legal text whose objects are so successfully
achieved, and whose usefulness to the reader's understanding of the judicial
process is so remarkable, that the unaccustomed reviewer's natural trepidation
is overcome by a desire to acquaint others with the source of his enlightenment. Professor Neil MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory' is
such a book, and its importance justifies an extensive review.
As the title implies, MacCormick sets himself an ambitious task. Any
inquiry into the realm of legal theory must necessarily expose the reader to
broad expanses of law, philosophy, and formal logic, and the uninitiated
reader may soon find himself on shaky ground. Commendably, the author
states at the outset the purposes he intends the book to achieve, and pursues
them throughout. The book's stated purposes are twofold: to develop and to
defend a thesis concerning the "limits of practical reason" in evaluative arguments of whatever kind, including especially legal argument, and "to advance
an explanation of the nature of legal argumentation as manifested in the public
process of litigation and adjudication upon disputed matters of law.''2
MacCormick views legal argumentation as a highly intricate process of
justification, and this forms the focal point of Legal Reasoning and Legal
Theory. That judges must dispense not only justice, but justice according to
law, requires that legal decisions be justified by means of relevant criteria,
and implies a certain minimum standard of judicial performance. The kinds
of reasons that conduce to a legally justified decision in any given case are
dictated largely by the clarity with which the applicable legal rules are perceived and interpreted by the judge or appellate court. Similarly, the complexity of those reasons will depend on the degree to which the pertinent legal
rules, once identified and construed, can be said to compel a decision one way
or the other. The book's format takes account of this, and the reader is constantly exposed to legal decisions that call for progressively more sophisticated
arguments of justification.
Professor MacCormick begins by showing, with the aid of reported legal
decisions taken from Scots and English law, that purely deductive logic can
provide a means of justifying legal conclusions in at least some cases, and
that evidentiary rules complement this process by establishing what factual
propositions will be taken to be true for the purposes of the litigation.8 The
1 Clarendon Law Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). MacCormick is Regius
Professor of Public Law, and former Dean of Law, in the University of Edinburgh.
2 Id. at 7.
3Id. at 19-52.
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author cautions, however, that deductive reasoning is only of limited usefulness, in that it presupposes certain premises whose soundness cannot be demo-

strated by deduction alone 4 Some of these premises are established by

resolving certain problems that inevitably emerge when statutory or case-law
rules are applied to specific fact situations. MacCormick calls these problems
the "problem of interpretation," 5 the "problem of relevancy," and the "problem of classification," 7 and argues that their resolution necessarily involves'8
"making a choice between two rival norms as acceptable propositions of law."
After setting forth the limits of deductive justification in legal argument,
and thereby laying a groundwork for the balance of his thesis, MacCormick
proceeds to consider one of the most hotly contested issues in contemporary
jurisprudence: How can judges arrive at legally justified decisions when no
existing legal rule provides unequivocal guidance? 9 It is difficult to improve on
the author's assessment of that controversy:
It is sometimes possible to justify legal decisions by deductive arguments whose
premisses are valid rules of law and propositions of 'proven' fact. Given certain
presuppositions about the nature of legal systems and the obligations of legal
officials such justifications are conclusive. But we can run out of rules without
running out of the need for legal decisions-because rules are unclear, or because
the proper classification of relevant facts is disputable, or even because there is
dispute whether there is or is not any legal ground at all for some claim or decision
is: how can it
at law. The really interesting question about legal argumentation
proceed when in this sense we do 'run out of rules'?' 0

What is needed, of course, is a theory of legal reasoning capable of leading to
sound legal conclusions in situations where the practical utility of logic is
spent. MacCormick develops such a theory, and calls the particular type of
argument embraced by it an argument of "second-order justification."' 1
4 MacCormick argues that two of the fundamental assumptions of positivistic legal
theory are (1) that it is possible for a judge to identify all rules that have the status of
law, and (2) that "every judge has in virtue of his office a duty to apply each and every
one of those rules which are 'rules of law' whenever it is relevant and applicable to any
case brought before him." Id. at 54.
GId.at 68ff.
6Id. at 70ff.
7 Id. at 95ff.
8Id.at 81. The author devotes ch. 4 to an elucidation of these concepts in the context of what he calls "the constraint of formal justice!'. Op. cit., at 73-99.
) See, e.g., Allen, Law in the Making, (7th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964);
Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 121-50; Wasserstron, The
Judicial Decision (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1961); Hodgson, Consequences of Utili-

tarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Stone, The Province and Function of Law

(London: Stevens, 1947); Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1964); Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970); Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed., New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1969); Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously (rev. ed., Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1979); Frank, Law and
the Modern Mind (New York: Coward-McCann, 1936); Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition (Boston: Little Brown, 1960); Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, trans. Knight
(Berkeley: U. Cal. Press, 1967); Cross, Precedent in English Law (3d ed. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977); Jaffe, English and American Judges as Lawmakers (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1969); Smith, Legal Obligation (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1976).
10 Supra note 1, at 100.
11 Id. at 101.
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Arguments of second-order justification presuppose that judges adhere to a
concept of "formal justice' 2 that requires them to justify decisions born of
particularlegal controversies by making generic rulings on the points of law
involved, while at the same time recognizing an obligation to keep their judicial pronouncements "interstitial."' 3 Once granted this assumption, secondorder justification amounts to the making of rational choices between rival
possible rulings,' 4 and it is at this stage that MacCormick introduces an
elaborate "mechanism" by which these choices can reasonably be made.
MacCormick's concept of second-order justification can be outlined only
briefly here. Essentially, it requires that possible rival rulings be "tested" for
their compatibility with the underlying principles of the legal system of which
they will form a part. The over-all acceptability of a novel legal ruling, and
therefore the extent to which a decision based on it will be legally justified,
will depend on how the proposed ruling fares under the critical scrutiny of
different kinds of evaluative arguments. First, a novel ruling whose acceptance
is advocated must be supported by sound "consequentialist" arguments, based
on perceived notions of common sense, justice, expediency, and public
policy,15 which demonstrate the acceptability of the ruling's probable consequences for the legal system. But sound consequentialist reasons, although
necessary to the justifying process, are not sufficient in themselves, and must
be supplemented by two other kinds of tests: the test for "consistency" and the
test for "coherence." The test for "consistency" requires that "however desirable on consequentialist grounds a given ruling might be, it may not be
adopted if it is contradictory of some valid and binding rule of the system";' 0
the test for "coherence" requires that, even if a possible ruling satisfies the test

12

See generally, id. at 73-103.

13 Id. at 122.
14 Id. at 101.

15 Id. at 151. By providing the term "consequentialist" to denote these kinds of arguments, MacCormick fills a gap in the terminology that was noticed much earlier by Cross.
In the first edition of Precedent in English Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 220,
222, Cross states:
When a judge does consider the pros and cons of each party's case, there is no
recognized name for the reasoning, but it has characteristics of its own which distinguish it from deduction and induction. It has been well described by Profesor
Wisdom as:
a matter of weighing the cumulative effects of one group of severally inconclusive items against the cumulative effects of another group of severally
inconclusive items.
It is not the same as reasoning about questions of fact. The judge sometimes has
to consider the probable social consequences of his decision, but he is also concerned with such matters as the manner in which his decision can be justified in
the light of existing legal principles, the kinds of legal argument which it may be
used to support in the future and the force of conflicting analogies.
The important thing is that it is of the essence of the judicial process that the pros
and cons should first be weighed.
The identical passages occur in the second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at
192-93, 195 and in the third edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at 194, 197.
1; Supra note 1, at 106.
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for consistency, it may be adopted only if the principle of which the novel
ruling is an instance "can be brought within the ambit of the existing body of
general legal principle."'1 7 The aforementioned 18 problems of "interpretation,"
"relevancy," and "classification," which constantly give rise to the propounding
of innovative legal rulings as potential legal doctrine, must be resolved by the
successive application of these tests, if our system of law is to comprise "a
consistent and coherent body of norms whose observance secures certain
valued goals which can intelligently be pursued all together."'19 Second-order
justification of legal decisions therefore involves "consequentialist arguments
which are essentially evaluative and therefore in some degree subjective."2 0
It requires lawyers and judges to transcend the limits of practical reason, by
arguing for, and ultimately by making, rational choices which no amount of
logic will be capable of defending conclusively.
Admittedly, all this has a certain elegance and plausibility. Still, it requires a great deal of explanation and corroboration, and Professor MacCormick provides these in abundance. With the aid of numerous examples, taken
primarily from reported Scots and English cases on public and private law and
interspersed throughout some one hundred and fifty pages of explanatory text,
the author provides persuasive arguments for the validity of both the normative and the descriptive aspects of his theory. He argues that, in difficult
litigation, legal principles and arguments from analogy tend to support legal
conclusions without compelling them, and that the requirements of strong
consequentialist arguments and of consistency must be met even where a
persuasive analogical argument is put forth. The requirements of coherence
and consistency thus limit the field within which judicial creativity may legiti2
mately operate. '
MacCormick then explains, in the context of his theory, the processes of
case4aw' 2 and statutory interpretation, and argues that both of these interpretative processes require recourse to consequentialist arguments and to
arguments of principle, in addition to the more obvious appeal to consistency.
To this extent, the differences between the interpretation of case-law rules and
the interpretation of statutes have, in the author's view, been exaggerated. So
too has been the difference between "clear" and "hard" cases, and the author
17

Id. at 107.

18 Supra notes 5, 6, 7.

19 Supra note 1, at 106.
20 Id.

Id. at 153ff.
22 MacCormick provides (id. at 82-86, 116-19, 212-28) a very useful commentary
on the ratio decidendi of a case and defines it in the context of the "justificatory" function
21

of the judge or appellate court:
The ratio decidendi is the ruling expressly or impliedly given by a judge which is
sufficient to settle a point of law put in issue by the parties' arguments in a case,
being a point on which a ruling was necessary to his justification (or one of his
alternate justifications) of the decision in the case. (The caveat must be repeated
here that, on this view, by no means all cases-even "leading" cases-have a single
ratio decidendi).

Op. cit., at 215.
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dispels the notion advanced by some theorists23 that legal positivism necessarily comprehends a wide discretion for judges in so-called "hard cases." As
I hope to have made clear, Professor
MacCormick's entire elaborate theory
24
argues convincingly to the contrary.
MacCormick's views as to what constitutes a good or a bad, an acceptable
or an unacceptable, legal argument are inextricably bound up with his contention 25 that ultimate normative premises cannot be derived from the application of reason alone. Granted certain premises, we can determine what
conclusions should follow from them, but no manner of logic can tell us what
fundamental assumptions we should act upon in the first place. But even
though our ultimate moral premises can never be demonstrated to be correct,
that is not to say that "our adherence to such principles is other than a manifestation of our rational nature, ' 26 and this crucial distinction informs all
aspects of his theory. He seeks to steer a middle course 7 between the un-i
diluted irrationalism of legal writers like Ross,28 who view the concept of
justice as being a mere expression of conflicting emotions; and the ultrarationalism29 of Dworkin, who contends that all legal controversies have a
single "right" answer which, in principle, is capable of being rationally
demonstrated3 0
MacCormick's theory incorporates an important philosophical dichotomy. 3 ' On the one hand, reasoning enables us not only to deduce consequences from accepted legal norms, but enables us also to determine whether
the norms from which we reason belong to a coherent and self-consistent
order; on the other hand, however, our conviction that order and rationality
are themselves desirable is one which cannot be conclusively proven correct
by an appeal to reason.3 2 We must make
a choice, to be-rational or not, and it is an ever-present choice in relation to all
aspects of our life, whether as theorists or scientists working on explanations of
the nature of things, or as practical agents going about the business of life interacting with 33
other animate beings with -some set of legal, moral, and social
relationships.
23

Notably, Dworkin. See Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 9, chs. 4, 13.
Supra note 1, at 250-58.
25 MacCormick acknowledges (Id. at 1-8) his reliance on aspects of the philosophies of Hume, Reid and Kant in setting forth his argument concerning the limits of
practical reason.
24

2

6 Supra note 1,at 6.

27

See generally, id. at 265-74.
Ross's views on the fundamental irrationality of the concept of justice are expressed in Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence(Denmark: Munksgaard, 1946); On Law
and Justice (London: Stevens, 1958); and Directives and Norms (London: Routledge &
K. Paul, 1968).
29 This is MacCormicek's designation.
30
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 9, chs. 1-4, 12, 13; and
Dworkin, "No Right Answer?", in Hacker and Raz, eds., Law, Morality and Society
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at 58.
28

31 Supra note 1, at 267ff.
32

See generally, id. at 265-74.

33 Id.at 269.
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It is in the context of his argument concerning the limits of practical
reason that MacCormick provides a series of legitimate criticisms of Dworkin's
so-called "Rights Thesis. '3 4 Dworkin's notion of the "strong discretion" which
legal positivism supposes judges to exercise in hard cases35 is repudiated by
MacCormick's wealth of examples of how deductive and second-order justification operate on a solid foundation of "formal justice." 36 The author
provides other, more specific, criticisms. He argues that the manner in which
Dworkin defines "principles," "policies," and "goals" in elaborating the
"Rights Thesis" is seriously confusing. The confusion arises from Dworkin's
ascription of special and somewhat narrow meanings to these words, which
effectively defines out of existence 3 7 powerful philosophical arguments that
are contrary to Dworkin's general thesis, but that quite legitimately use the
concepts of "principles," "policies," and "goals" in their more usual senses. 88
In reference to Dworkin's assertion that in all legal controversies that take
the form of litigation there is a single right answer capable of being rationally
discovered,3 9 MacCormick contends that this argument fails to take into account a subtle ambiguity in the idea of "disagreement." 40 The author proposes
that disagreement can be either "speculative" or "practical." Speculative disagreement implies the application of different evaluative criteria to a seemingly
clear problem, thereby resulting in disagreement about the correct answer. Practical disagreement necessitates, even when there is no longer any speculative
disagreement, an often difficult choice as to what course of action, to the
exclusion of other possible options, should be taken. 41 MacCormick contends
that the most basic disagreements in law are inevitably practical in nature,
and that
[genuine practical disagreement, about which the parties [to the litigation] really
care, arises not because of irrationality, not because there is a truly right answer
which someone has failed to see, but because-or when-the decision one way or
the other cannot be avoided and must be taken by people who cannot 'each go
his own way'42 but who must decide together one way or the other and live with
the decision.
3
4Supra note 30. Other illuminating criticisms can be found in Raz, Professor
Dworkin's Theory of Rights (1978), 26 Political Studies 123; and in Greenawalt, Discretion and JudicialDecision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind fudges (1975),
75 Col. L. Rev. 359; and Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision (1977), 11 Ga. L. Rev. 991.
3

5Supra note 23.

30

Supra notes 12, 13.
7 Supra note 1, at 261, 264.
38 Supra note 9, at 90. Dworkin asserts that "[a]rguments of principle are arguments
intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to
establish a collective goal. Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are
3

propositions that describe goals." For MacCormick's reasons as to why these designations
are inappropriate, see id. at 259-74.
3

9 Supra note 30.

40 Supra note 1, at 247ff.
41
1d. at 246-55. MacCormick's distinction between "speculative' and "practical"
disagreement corresponds very closely to the distinction in normative ethics between what
Stevenson called "disagreement in belief" and "disagreement in attitude." Stevenson,
Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1944) ch. 1; Copi, Introduction to
Logic (New York: MacMillan, 1978) at 73-77.

42 Id.at 248.
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The author concludes the book with an appendix, in which he provides
a useful and entertaining account of how H.L.A. Hart's important formulation
of the "internal aspect" of normative behavior4 3 needs to be supplemented by
taking into account the "volitional" as well as the "cognitive" aspects of it.44
Notwithstanding MacCormick's evident scholarship, Legal Reasoning
and Legal Theory is more than a mere continuation of (in MacCormick's
words) the "often hot but always arid"45 jurisprudential debate. The book is
eminently readable, and exhibits none of the "pompo-verbosity" 40 which has
sometimes pervaded discursive academic writing4 7 and which, regrettably,
still has its unwitting exponents. 48 When the author repeats himself, the repetitions serve to help the reader follow the argument as it develops.
Professor MacCormick writes lucidly, and with a droll wit that has
become something of a hallmark among the best-known legal theorists.
Readers familiar with the recent literature cannot fail to have noticed the series
of genteel barbs exchanged between Dworkin and his principal non-adherents,
notably H.L.A. Hart. It is as if each seeks to proclaim the ascendancy of his
own theory, while at the same time emphasizing the superior panache with
which he is able to disparage the views of his rivals. For example, in his wellknown essay, Hard Cases,49 Dworkin introduces into his commentary, for
43 See Hart, supra note 9, chs. 5, 6. Of the numerous reviews of Hart's book, one of
the most incisive is that by Sartorius, "Hart's Concept of Law," in Summers, ed., More
Essays in Legal Philosophy (Los Angeles: U. Cal. Press, 1971) at 131.
44
Supra note 1, at 240-41, 275-92.
45 Id. at 188. For a summary of recent jurisprudential literature with a Canadian
perspective, see Lewis, Annual Survey of CanadianLaw: Jurisprudence(1979), 11 Ottawa
L. Rev. 733.
46 Gowers, The Complete Plain Words, rev. B. Fraser (rev. ed., London: H. M.
Stationery Off., 1979) at 64-65.
47 In his Problems of Jurisprudence (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1949) Fuller
prefaced his comments on Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence (4th ed. London: J. Murray,
1879) with these remarks:
The reader now has awaiting him about two hundred pages of what may well be
the dreariest prose ever penned by man. In fact, so elaborate and tortuous are
Austin's distinctions that they achieve at times the relief of humor, though a humor,
it should be added, that is at once unintended and somewhat grim.
Austin's style is seldom mentioned without some reference to a letter written in
1817 to his future bride when he was a young apprentice at the bar. He was then
working in the chambers of an equity draftsman, and he wrote:
"I apprehend that the habit of drawing [bills in equity] will in no short time give
me so exclusive and intolerant a taste (as far, I mean, as relates to my own
productions) for perspicuity and precision, that I shall hardly venture on sending
a letter of much purpose, even to you, unless it be laboured with the accuracy
and circumspection which are requisite in a deed of conveyance."
Op. cit., at 103.
48 One of Orwell's most important essays concerned this very subject. See Orwell,
"Politics and the English Language," in Bell and Encel, eds., Inside the Whale and Other
Essays (Australia: Pergamon Press, 1978) at 142. Orwell was particularly irritated by
the familiar "not-un-" usage, and suggested that writers rid themselves of this vulgarity
by memorizing the following sentence: "A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall
rabbit across a not ungreen field." Op. cit., at 155.
4
9 Supra note 9, ch. 4.
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purposes of illustration, a judge "of superhuman skill, learning, patience and
acumen"50 whom he calls Hercules. Later in the same essay, 51 Dworkin introduces, again for illustrative purposes, another fictional judge, but one whose
analytical abilities are decidedly more modest. Dworkin calls this judge
Herbert, which happens to be H.L.A. Hart's Christian name. In American
52
JurisprudenceThrough English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream,

H.L.A. Hart in turn proposes that Dworkin's theory, as expounded in Hard
Cases and elaborated upon elsewhere, 53 is a noble, but nonetheless an untenable, dream, and that perhaps the sensible theorist should steer a middle course
and settle for a mere "good night's sleep. ' 54 To these criticisms, Dworkin is
alternately gracious5 5 and disapproving, and concludes his rejoinder by stating
that the "dream" imputed to his theory by Hart and other critics is "more
silly than noble."56 These observations might seem digressive in a review of
MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, but they are necessary in

order to appreciate the humour of MacCormick's contribution to the fray.
Near the end of the book, the author devotes a chapter5 7 to a comparison of
his own theory vis-h-vis aspects of those of Dworkin and Hart and, although
he acknowledges their respective contributions at several points,5 8 he does not
fail to get his own innings in:
Dworkin postulates a Hercules who can construct a best-possible theory of a given
legal system. But Hercules can construct that only at the far end of an infinite
regress of theories. Dworkin has landed his Hercules in Augean stables in which
the dung cannot run out, because it is in infinite supply. 59

The above digression serves also to affirm a more general point: that it is
possible for a book on legal theory to entertain as well as to instruct.
Professor MacCormick's book stands firmly as a distinctive contribution
to the literature, and has been readily acknowledged as such. 6° More extensive critical scrutiny is sure to be forthcoming. Legal theorists have traditionally been anything but reluctant to appraise the contributions of their
.5Id. at 105ff.
51 Id. at 125ff.
62

(1977), 11 Ga. L. Rev. 969.

53 Supra note 30.
54

Dworkin, "Reply to Critics," in Dworkin, supra note 9, at 292-93.

55 Dworkin states that Hart "offered only predictions of the faults others might find,

and did even this so gently, and with such generosity, as to make me realize once again
that criticism at his hands always gives pleasure as well as instruction." Id. at 292.
56 Id. at 293.
,7Supra note 1, at 229-64.
58 E.g., id. at 229, 231, 241, 256, 258.
59 Id. at 255. To appreciate the wittiness of this remark, one must first remember
that Dworkin called his "Rights Thesis" judge "Hercules" (Supra note 9, at 105ff.), and
then harken back to Greek mythology. The cleansing of the Augean stables, which con-

tained three thousand stalls for oxen, was one of the twelve "labours" Hercules was required to perform in order to gain his freedom from Eurystheus. Hercules accomplished
this particular task by diverting the rivers Alpheus and Peneus, so that they flowed through
the Augean stables during the whole of one night.
6
0See Caplan (1980), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 817; Ferguson (1979), 6 Brit. J.L. and
Soc. 272; Clark (1979), 12 Vand. J. Trans. L. 1037.
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colleagues, and our understanding of lav has been a beneficiary of that
tradition.
The book has functional, as well as theoretical, importance. Its usefulness to practitioners lies in the soundness of the principles of legal justification that MacCormick sets forth, in their appropriateness to virtually all
spheres of legal activity, and in their consequent usefulness to any person
for whom legal concepts are important. The essential premise of the British
judicial system is, of course, that judges must impart not only justice, but
justice according to law, and MacCormick uses this same basic premise as his
point of departure in generating an elaborate theory as to what "justice
according to law" necessarily implies for judicial performance. What special
types of legal argument will, so far as possible, ensure a legally justified
decision in any given context? It is just this question that MacCormick's book
is concerned to answer and, in this reviewer's opinion, convincingly does so.
The author makes more explicit and exact, principles of legal justification
which were hitherto largely implicit and obscure. Legal Reasoning and Legal
Theory should be considered required reading for the student or teacher who
seeks a more sophisticated understanding of the judicial process, for the
lawyer who seeks to construct a persuasive legal argument in order to promote
a client's arguable legal rights, and for the judge upon whom falls the onerous
responsibility of dispensing justice according to law. 61
By

61
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including Can Stares Decisis be Abolished? (1966), Jur. Rev. 197; Justice According to
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